Sui Provenance Suite

Deploy what you trust. Verify what you see.




Can Others Verify What You Deploy?

"Trust" is still the default in Web3

- Can you prove your frontend hasn't been tampered with?
- Can others verify your Move package came from your repo?
- Hashes alone don't tell the full story.

→ There's a missing link between GitHub and on-chain code.

Don't Trust. Verify.



- Trust is not a UX problem.
 It's an infrastructure design problem.
- Provenance, not as a feature but as a new standard for blockchains.
- First to make end-to-end provenance native
 on the Sui Stack.

https://x.com/EvanWeb3/status/1905728305569128649

The Toolkit


Sui Provenance Suite

- Walrus Sites Provenance verifiable frontend deployment.
- Sui MVR Provenance verifiable Move package registry.
- Notary browser-based verification UI.
- GitSigner secure PIN-based external signing.

→ One suite, Full-stack provenance, and live.

Walrus Sites Provenance

- 1. Website (GitHub)
- 2. GitHub Actions (CI)
 - a. npm run build
 - b. Sigstore signs → generate site.intoto.jsonl
 - c. Walrus sites deploy (resources + site.intoto.jsonl)
- 3. Verified on **notary.wal.app**




Self-Verifying Example

Case Study: notary.wal.app


- Notary doesn't just verify others it proves its own deployment.
- It is built, signed, and deployed via GitHub Actions using the same Walrus + Sigstore pipeline.
- Its .intoto.jsonl provenance is public and verifiable on itself.

→ A trust tool that proves it can be trusted.




Sui MVR Provenance


- Move Package (GitHub)
- 2. GitHub Actions (CI)
 - a. Build with sui move build → generate bytecode.dump.json.
 - b. Sign and deploy move package.
 - c. Sigstore signs → generate *mvr.intoto.jsonl*.
 - d. MVR Register Move Package (tx digest + mvr.intoto.jsonl)
- 3. Verified on **notary.wal.app**



From Form to Cryptographic Provenance








Beyond Registration

MVR = Move <u>Verifiable</u> Registry

- "V" is for Verifiable.
- Every package is signed, linked to commits, and reproducible.
- Metadata is traceable across GitHub and chain.

→ This isn't just a registry — it's a trust layer.



Verifiability is Infrastructure

Built-in Proof

- GitHub → Sigstore → On-chain
- .intoto.jsonl created automatically
- Open-source, ready to use
- Proof is default, not optional



Trust at Platform Level

- wal.app is more than hosting
- It's becoming a platform for provable dApps
- Only apps with verifiable origins are featured
- Users can trust what they run by design

wal.app & MVR is where trust begins — with provenance, by default.

Proof Doesn't End at Build

We can go further:

• Audits can be registered as metadata alongside the .intoto.jsonl file in MVR.

This metadata includes:

- Who audited it
- Which commit was reviewed
- Link to the public audit report

```
"audit": {
    "auditor": "TrustCheck Labs",
    "commit": "0xabc123",
    "report": "https://github.com/example/audits/v1.pdf"
}
```

→ This way, expert reviews become part of the on-chain trust layer — verifiable, inspectable, and tamper-proof.

Trust That Grows, Not Freezes

Technical proof is only the beginning. Trust needs to grow — not stay frozen in time.

We build a living layer of trust:

- Bounty programs for continuous review
- Developer–user challenges to test and improve code

→ This turns MVR into a dynamic trust ecosystem — where trust evolves, not just gets archived.

Links

- End-to-end provenance tooling for MVR.
 - https://github.com/zktx-io/sui-mvr-provenance
- A test repo that passes validation without any real source code.
 - https://github.com/zktx-io/sui-mvr-pass-but-fake
- Frontend provenance pipeline based on Walrus and Sigstore.
 - https://github.com/zktx-io/walrus-sites-provenance
- Frontend UI for verifying provenance files and site objects
 - https://github.com/zktx-io/walrus-sites-notary
- Live explorer to verify frontend provenance interactively
 - https://notary.wal.app

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